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Lugar: Duplicitous Allegations in Indictments

DUPLICITOUS ALLEGATIONS IN INDICTMENTS
MARLYN E. LUGAR*

T

HAT the West Virginia law as to duplicity in indictments is
in confusion was recognized by the court in State v. Howard,'
the most recent case in point.
"As the situation stands, no one can know what is the
law on the subject, or if he thinks he knows, cannot be certain
how long it will remain the law, and this, I think, is to be
deplored."2

These words of Judge Fox seem to describe aptly the current status
of the West Virginia law as to duplicity in indictments, though they
were used in reference to a different but somewhat related problem.8
"Duplicity" or "double pleading" consists of stating for one
purpose two or more distinct grounds of complaint or defense when
4
one of them would be as effectual in law as both or all of them.
This study will deal only with duplicity in indictments. More
specifically, it will be an attempt to determine whether a count in
an indictment charging the commission of two or more crimes
is so faulty or defective that it will be held insufficient on a demurrer or motion to quash. 5 No attempt will be made to discuss
*Professor of Law, West Virginia University.
1 17 W. Va. 519, 73 S.E.2d 18 (1952).
2Dissenting opinion in State v. Stolhngs, 128 W. Va. 483, 491, 37 S.E.2d 98,
101 (1946).
3 The issue involved in the Stollings case was whether an indictment which
charges in one count the commission of several distinct offenses in the disjunctive
is bad on demurrer or motion to quash. If the commission of the several
distinct offenses is charged in the conjunctive, the problem arises as to whether
the count is bad on demurrer or motion to quash because of duplicity.
'State v. Vaughan, 93 W. Va. 419, 424, 117 S.E. 127, I29 (13) (point 5
of the syllabus prepared by the court). See also Carlin, Election of Causes or
Grounds of Action in a Duplicitous Declaration,40 W. VA. L.Q. 241, 242 (1934).
Mr. Carlin indicates that the term "duplicity" has been used to designate the
situation where more causes of action than one or more defenses than one are
alleged in a single pleading. As indicated in the text which follows, the term
is here used in the more restrictive sense, namely, the situation where in a single
count more than one ground for a conyiction is alleged. This separates the
problem here from that in misjoinder of offenses in separate counts in an
indictment.
5 In West Virginia, in criminal procedure, the common law general demurrer
may be used to question the sufficiency of the allegations of the pleading.
Without specification, every point of allegation is challenged. A defective
allegation in an indictment may also be challenged by a general motion to quash.
Without specification, such motion challenges every point of allegation. These
two methods of attack may be employed interchangeably to reach all defects
on the face of an indictment, whether of form or substance. In practice, they
are often used in combination to reach such defects. For a more detailed treatment of the proper functions of a general demurrer or a general motion to
quash, as contrasted with the use of a motion to quash with particularization
of the points on which reliance is placed, see State v. DeBoard, 119 W. Va. 396,

194 SX..349 (1937).
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the possibility of using a motion in arrest of judgment to reach
such defect, nor will there be an analysis of the technique of requiring the state to elect a crime included in such count for which
a conviction is sought. Whether the defendant may be convicted of
more than one offense on such a count is also outside the scope of
review. Joinder of offenses in separate counts of an indictment,
for similar offenses or for the same offense committed in different
ways, 6 will be mentioned only to the extent that it may have a
bearing on the issue of joinder of offenses in the same count in an
indictment.
In the Howard case, the court indicates that the following
rules of law may be applied in deciding whether duplicity renders
a count in an indictment bad on demurrer or motion to quash:
(1) The joining of two or more misdemeanors in a single
count of an indictment will not make that count fatally defective,
although such joinder of separate felonies will;
(2) If the form of the indictment is prescribed by statute,
"the very statute itself bars an attack on the indictment on the
ground of duplicity". 7
Another principle was applied by the court in holding that the
count was not duplicitous. This involved an examination to determine whether more than one crime was effectually charged. By
definition a count will not be duplicitous if it charges the commission of only one crime, even though it may be defective for
other reasons." The court determined that the one-count indictment properly charged the "illegal sale of alcoholic liquor without
a State license," and disregarded as surplusage the allegations of
"aiding and abetting" in such sale since that part of the count
did not properly charge the commission of such crime.9
These principles, expounded by the court in its latest decision
in point, will serve as a starting point for an examination of the
earlier decisions. Are these rules in accord with earlier decisions?
A. Joinder of Misdemeanors and Felonies
In the Howard case, the court indicates that two or more misdemeanors may, but that two or more felonies may not, be joined in
the same count in an indictment. A third variation might have
been enunciated, namely, that a felony and a misdemeanor cannot
See Note, 57 W. VA L. REv. 196 (1955).
137 W. Va. at 541, 73 S.E.2d at 31.
8 E.g., it may not meet the requirement of W. VA. CONST. art. II, § 14,
that the accused be fully and plainly informed of the character and cause of
the accusation.
9 137 W. Va. at 541, 73 S.F2d at 31.
8
7
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be joined in the same count unless the lesser offense is included in
the greater. 0
A chronological treatment of the earlier decisions to determine
the correctness of these and other rules applied to the problem
would make the most interesting treatment of the subject, but
would perhaps require more space than would be justified. In lieu
of that approach the cases will be grouped as to the rules discussed
without special treatment as to the time at which the limitations
were developed.
Initially there is a group of cases, not overruled, which indicates
that duplicity is merely a formal defect, whether the joinder be of
misdemeanors or felonies, and that as such the defect cannot be
reached by a demurrer or motion to quash because of the provisions
of what is now Chapter 62, Article 2, Section 10, of the West
Virginia Code.". This principle was first enunciated in 1915 in
State v. Jarrell,12which involved the joinder of misdemeanors. The
court there described the rule forbidding duplicity as a technical
rule, one not designed for the protection of the accused, and
stated that in an indictment it is innocuous on demurrer since the
statute provides that no indictment shall be quashed or deemed
invalid "for the omission or insertion of any other words of mere
form or surplusage".1 3
In State v. Hudson, 4 the joinder of felonies in one count of
the indictment was involved. The court decided that the count,
alleging that the defendant did "embezzle, abstract and wilfully
misplace money, funds, and credits," charged three separate offenses
and three separate objects as to each offense. Nevertheless, the
court concluded that the count was not bad on demurrer by reason
of the joinder of these offenses, because no objection could be
taken for mere form under the provisions of this statute. Referring
to the Jarrell case, the court made this comment:

10 Although the statement is here limited to the joinder in a single count
of a felony and a misdemeanor, the rule apparently applies to the joinder of
several distinct felonies in the same count if the lesser is included in the
greater. See text at.notes 30 and 37 infra.
11 This section was adopted from the Virginia Code of 1860 and the
wording has not been changed since its adoption. It provides that no indictment
or other accusation shall be quashed or deemed invalid for numerous specified
formal defects and then adds "or for the omission or insertion of any other
words of mere form or surplusage."
1276 W. Va. 263, 85 S.E. 525 (1915).
is Id. at 266, 85 S.E. at 526. Italics supplied.
1493 W. Va. 435, 117 &E. 122 (1923).
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"'... That case involved a joinder of misdemeanors in
the same count; this case a joinder of felonies. But the statute
5
...makes no distinction. It applies to all indictments."I
To determine the correctness of one of the instructions which had
been given, the court analyzed the indictment count and determined
that the instruction was not applicable to the case, since the count
properly charged only embezzlement and that only as to one object.
The court might have taken this approach of only one offense
effectually charged to determine that the count was not duplicitous;' 6 but the court placed its decision as to duplicity squarely on
the statute.
On the same date that the Hudson case was decided, the court
handed down its decision in State v. Vaughan,17 both opinions
having been written by Judge Meredith. Duplicity had been urged
on the basis of joinder in the same count of a charge of felony with
charges of separate and distinct misdemeanors. The court met this
contention by finding that no felony had been charged. It is
evident that avoidance of the applicability of the statute as to
joinder of felonies in the same count was not desired in the Hudson
case, for this same approach might have been used there.' 8 In the
Vaughan case, the statute was held to save the count from a demurrer or motion to quash though the charges of separate misdemeanors remained therein.
The contention that a count was fatally defective for having
alleged two separate and distinct felonies therein was next made in
State v. Perry.0 In the count there were charged both forgery of
an instrument and uttering of that instrument. The court agreed
that the count charged two distinct felonies, agreed that it was thus
improper to join them in the same count even though the offenses
were of the same general nature; but held that, being merely
duplicity, it was a fault in form only and that the count was not
subject to demurrer or motion to quash on that ground. To support its position, the court cited the Jarrell and Vaughan cases.
The Hudson case was cited in this connection to indicate that
the state might be required to elect the offense on which it would
stand for conviction, but was not cited as to duplicity being merely
a formal defect. In State v. Runnion,20 there were two counts in
Id. at 443, 117 S.E. at 125.
16 For treatment of this approach, see part D of text.
's

17 98

W. Va. 419, 117 S.E. 127 (1923).

18 See text at note 16 supra.

19 101 W. Va. 123, 132 S.E. 68 (1926).
20 122 W. Va. 134, 7 SE.2d 648 (1940).
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the indictment and each alleged both forgery and uttering. Again
the court held that the separate felonies might be charged in each
count of the indictment, citing the Pery case to support the
holding.
In State v. Digman,21 the indictment, with only one count,
charged the defendant of rape, of being present aiding and abetting
another to commit rape, and of unlawfully aiding, abetting, procuring, hiring and employing another to commit rape. Thus, in one
count, the defendant was charged as both a principal in the first and
second degrees and also as an accessory before the fact. 22 It is
interesting to note that this single count also included accusations
against the other joint defendant. Although the court did not
approve this form of indictment, it held that it was not "open to
the question that it does not give the accused adequate information
concerning the charge against him." The indictment was held
sufficient, the court citing the Vaughan case in support of this
conclusion.
In these more recent cases permitting joinder of distinct
felonies in the same count, citing the Hudson case therein for
support would have strengthened the decisions.
Although the more recent of these decisions do not specifically
refer to the statute as being the basis of the decision, they do rely
directly upon decisions which held that duplicity, being merely a
formal defect, cannot be reached by a demurrer or motion to quash
under the provisions of West Virginia Code, Chapter 62, Article 2,
Section 10. The statute was applied in effect whether joinder was
of felonies or misdemeanors. Looking only at this series of cases,
it would seem that the law in this jurisdiction was clear by 1940.23
These cases never having been overruled to date, it would seem
that duplicity alone would no longer render any count fatally
defective.
However, both during the period covered by these decisions
and since 1940, the issue has been raised so many times and
discussed at such length by the court that this approach seems
unsafe. The Howard case, the most recent decision in point, is
121 W. Va. 499, 5 S.E.2d 113 (1939).
22.Rape being a felony, a principal in the second degree or an accessory
before the fact is "punishable as if he were the principal in the first degree."
W. VA. CODE c. 61, art. 11, § 6 (Michie 1955).
23 The Jarrell case was decided in 1915 and the Runnion case in 1940. In
the interim the court had applied the statute or decisions based thereon to bar
attack on the basis of duplicity in the Hudson, Vaughan, Perry and Digman
21

cases.

The Hudson, Perry, Digman and Runnion cases all involved joinder of

felonies in the same count.
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typical of the manner in which the problem occasionally has been
treated by the court; the earlier decisions, holding that the statute
bars an attack on a count for duplicity even though the joinder
be of felonies, having been overlooked. 24 Except for the cases
applying the statute, or citing cases based thereon, each case seems
to have been treated on an ad hoc basis with various other principles
being discussed. For example, in the Howard case, the second of
the rules expounded was that the form of the indictment being
25
statutory barred an attack thereon on the ground of duplicity.
B.

Lesser Included Offense

Before discussing the statutory-form-indictment rule, it seems
appropriate here to discuss another principle which has often been
applied and is more closely related to the- felony-misdemeanor
approach already discussed.
In the Vaughan case, the court said that the charge of duplicity
was being urged, "but in an unusual way,-that is, that there is a
joinder in the same count of a charge of felony with charges of
various separate and distinct misdemeanors".26 This type of duplicity had been noted in earlier West Virginia decisions, but in each
case an exception had been suggested, namely, that a misdemeanor
might be joined in the same count where the misdemeanor charged
was necessarily included in the greater offense. In State v. Tomlin,2"in a ore-count indictment the defendant was charged with both
operating and possessing a "moonshine still." The court took the
position that, even though possession was a separate offense and a
misdemeanor, it was also an incident to and included in the offense
of operating a "moonshine still," the greater offense including the
lesser. The court indicated that if such possession were not
"incidental to or included in" the other offense charged, the indictment might have been quashed because a felony was joined with
a misdemeanor. This decision was followed and applied to these

24 In State v. Wisman, 98 W. Va. 250, 252, 126 S.E. 701, 702 (1925), the
court said that "it is a violation of the fundamental laws of pleading to charge
two separate felonies in the same count of an indictment," and concluded that,
in order to sustain the indictment, it was necessary to find that only one felony
was properly charged in the count therein. This is the case which the court
cited in State v. Howard, 137 W. Va. 519, 541, 73 S.E.2d 18, 31 (1952) for the
proposition that separate felonies may not be properly charged in a single
count of an indictment.
25 137 W. Va. at 542, 73 S.E.2d at 31.
26 9a V. Va. at 423, 117 S.E. at 129. Italics supplied.
27 86 W. Va. 300, 103 S.E. 110 (1920).
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same two offenses charged in one count of an indictment in State
2
v. Murdock" and State v. Henson.."
A similar result seems to have been reached by the court in
permitting the joinder of larceny and burglary, or larceny and
breaking and entering (or entering without breaking), in the same
count in an indictment. Here it will be noted that this may result
in the permitted joinder of two felonies in the same count.3 0 This
rule seems to have had its origin in West Virginia in a dictum in
State v. McClung.31 In that case the larceny was not properly
charged, so only one offense was effectually alleged; but the court
said, "It is common and better practice to allege in one count both
the burglary and the larceny." 32 This was termed an "anomaly in
inserting two offences in one count, apparently violating the rule
against duplicity, and the rule against joining different offences,
especially in the same count.""" This rule was stated again by way
34
of dictum in point one of the syllabus to State v. Flanagan.
Both of these decisions preceded the Jarrell case, which first
applied the statute to bar an attack on duplicity, 35 but as recently
as 1948 the court was twice confronted with this type of joinder.3"
In neither case did the court rely on the statute or decisions based
thereon. In both cases the Flanagan case was cited as sole support
for the joinder, except that the first of these two cases was quoted
in the second. Although the point is not mentioned by the court,
grand larceny was joined with another felony in each of the two
counts in the first of these cases,37 whereas only petit larceny was
2890
gW.

Va. 628, 111 S.E. 632 (1922).

W. Va. 701, 114 S.E. 273 (1922). Contrast State v. Kyer, 55 W. Va.
46, 46 S.E. 694 (1904). Compare State v. Wisman, 93 W. Va. 183, 116 S.E. 698
(1928) with State v. Wisman, 98 W. Va. 250, 126 S.E. 701 (1925).
30 The larceny involved may be a felony. If the goods or chattels stolen
are of a value of $20 or more, this is grand larceny and is punishable by
confinement in the penitentiary. W. VA CODE c. 61, art. 3, § 13 (Michie 1955).
Offenses which are punishable by confinement in the penitentiary are felonies.
Id. c. 61, art. 11, § 1. See text at note 37 infra. Compare the statute permitting
joinder of counts for breaking and entering, or for entering without breaking,
with a count for burglary. See note 80 infra.
1 35 W. Va. 280, 13 S.E. 654 (1891).
2991

32

Id. at 282, 13 S.E. at 654.

at 284, 13 S.E. at 655. The Virginia court and others had permitted
such joinder in one count on a mistaken application of the principle of permitting joinder of a lesser crime included within a greater one. CLARtK,
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 327 (2d ed. 1918).
'448 W. Va. 115, 35 S.E. 862 (1900).
.15
See text at note 12 supra.
3
6 State v. Cutlp, 131 W. Va. 141, 46 S.E.2d 454 (1948); State v. Varner,
131 W. Va. 459, 48 S.E.2d 171 (1948).
37"Each count charges that defendants did commit larceny of three pork
hams and a pork shoulder of the aggregate value of $51.82." 131 W. Va. at
142, 46 S.E.2d at 456. See note 30 supra.
331d.
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joined in each of the two counts in the second case. '"s In the latter
case counsel made the specific objection that each count joined a
felony with a misdemeanor. Apparently counsel was relying upon
the principle urged in the Vaughan, Tomlin, Murdock, and Henson
cases."' The court did not mention that rule or its limitation,
although it would seem here that the misdemeanor was "incidental
to or included in" the other offense charged.
These two recent cases indicate that larceny, whether grand or
petit, may be joined with burglary or any of the statutory offenses
40
If
which have extended the scope of that common law crime.
this applied to the joinder of larceny even when charged as a
felony, it seems to follow that the joinder of any other felony with
burglary or any of the related statutory offenses cannot be reached
by a demurrer or motion to quash if the other felony reflects the
intent with which the entering or breaking and entering is charged
to have been done. 4' This would seem to be true even though the
decisions applying the statute to duplicity, even as to felonies, are
ignored.
C. Statutory Form of Indictment
Moreover, this indictment is in the form prescribed
any
by Section 7 of the statute, and the very statute itself bars
42
attack on the indictment on the ground of duplicity."
Thus reads the opinion in the Howard case; another reason given
for there being no valid objection to the indictment even if two
distinct offenses had been set forth in the one count therein. The
:1s See the second ground assigned for the demurrer and motion to quash
wherein complaint was made as to the joinder of a felony with petit larceny.
131 W. Va. at 460, 48 S.E.2d at 172.
39 See text at notes 26, 27, 28, and 29 supra.
40 The decided cases have involved joinder with larceny of "breaking and
entering an outhouse adjoining a dwelling house", "breaking and entering an
outbuilding not adjoining a dwelling house" (both in the Cutlip case, supra
note 36), "breaking and entering a storehouse", and "entering a storehouse
without breaking" (the latter two in the Varner case, supra note 36). For
other extensions of the common law crime of burglary, see W. VA. CODE c. 61.
art. 3, §§ 11 and 12 (Michie,1955).
41 For burglary at common law, the breaking and entering was required to
be with the intent to commit a felony. An intent to commit larceny was not
required; the intent to commit any felony was sufficient. This is also true
with respect to the statutory extensions of the common law crime of burglary.
[bid. For example, breaking and entering with intent to commit rape within
the building would be sufficient-for burglary or the related statutory offenses.
Therefore, if grand larceny may be joined in a count with burglary or the
related statutory offenses when the intent to commit larceny is an element of the
other crime, it seems that rape may be joined in a count with burglary or a
related statutory offense when the intent to commit rape is alleged as an
element of the other crime.
42 State v. Howard, 137 W. Va. 519, 542, 73 S.E.2d 18, 31 (1952).
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statement is broad enough to apply to felonies as well as misdemeanors, although the offenses actually involved were misdemeanors.
No authority was cited for the soundness of this proposition,
and it has often been demonstrated that the mere fact that the
legislature has prescribed the form of indictment for an offense
does not protect the indictment from attack.4 3 In fact, this same
indictment was held deficient in the Howard case to the extent that
it attempted to charge the crime of aiding and abetting in the
unlawful sale of alcoholic liquor without a state license: this left
only the offense of unlawfully selling alcoholic liquor without a state
license. Accordingly, the proposition here discussed is merely
obiter dictum because that part of the count which applied to
aiding and abetting may be disregarded as surplusage, a principle
often applied to save such counts and discussed in some detail later
in this paper.
Although this dictum in the Howard case is the most explicit
statement found to the effect that joinder of two or more distinct
offenses in one count in a statutory form of indictment will bar an
attack on the basis of duplicity, some emphasis had been given to
this approach in earlier decisions not cited in the opinion.
In State v. Miller,4 4 the defendant was indicted upon the charge
that he did "unlawfully sell, give, offer, expose, keep and store for
sale and gift, liquors." The court recognized that the indictment
was in the form prescribed by the statute. The indictment was
held not subject to attack by demurrer for "duplicity", even though
separate and distinct offenses were charged, for two or more offenses
of the same general nature may be joined in "an indictment". The
court apparently failed to draw a distinction between duplicity
45
and joinder of crimes in different counts.
The Miller case was followed in State v. Counts,4" where a
warrant charged substantially the same combination of offenses as
to intoxicating liquor. A motion to quash was made on the ground
that the warrant did not specifically inform the defendant of the
nature of the charge alleged against him so that he could
prepare his defense. Held, that even though distinct offenses were
43 In accord with the Howard case are State v. Garcia, 83 S.E.2d 528 (W. Va.
1954); State v. Ray, 122 W. Va. 39, 7 S.E.2d 654 (1940); State v. McGinnis, 116
W. Va. 473, 181 S.E. 820 (1935); and Scott v. Harshbarger, 116 W. Va. 800, 180
S.E. 187 '(1935) (habeas corpus proceeding against the sheriff). The statutory
forms held defective in the last three cases were amended by the legislature in
1953. The indictment form held defective in the Howard and Garcia cases has
not been amended. See W. VA. CODE c. 60, art. 6, § 7 (Michie 1955). For the
amended forms, see id. c. 62, art. 4, §§ 5, 7 and 15.
44 89 W. Va. 84, 108 S.E. 487
45 For further development of

(1927).
this point, see part E of text.
46 9D W. Va. 338, 110 SE. 812 (1922).
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charged, the warrant was not bad for "duplicity". The court concluded discussion of this point with the observation:
"... The warrant is in the statutory form of an indictment
for these offenses which has been held sufficient to satisfy the
requirements as to time, place and circumstance and certainty
as to the offense charged, and to serve as a protection against
future prosecution for the same offense.

..

47

Again the Miller case was followed in State v. Joseph,48 where
the indictment contained two counts. The first count charged the
defendant with owning, operating, maintaining, possessing and
having an interest in a "moonshine still. The court held that the
demurrer was properly overruled, with this remark being made:
"... The indictment is in the prescribed statutory form
and in the language of the statute.... It is sufficient. .... -49
If these opinions are read in the light of the decisions which
have held statutory forms of indictments bad for omitting matters
of substance, the conclusion may be drawn that a statutory form
bars attack as to duplicity because this defect is merely formal. If
this be true, may not the same result be attained by a general statute
forbidding an attack on any indictment on the ground of form
rather than prescribing statutory forms for numerous offenses?
This approach seems to have been approved by the cases which
hold that West Virginia Code, Chapter 62, Article 2, Section 10, has
accomplished this result as to duplicity, whether joinder of misdemeanors or felonies be involved. If those cases be wrong as a
matter of interpretation, though never overruled, the need of such
legislation seems apparent. No thought is here expressed that such
legislation should save an indictment or any count therein which
truly leaves the defendant in doubt as to the nature of the accusation. 0
D. Additional Offenses as Surplusage
By joining several distinct offenses in one count, the indictment
containing only this count is rendered dupiicitous. If only one
of the offenses which seem to be alleged in the count is held to have
been sufficiently alleged, duplicity disappears. The same legerdemain results if the allegations as to one of two offenses alleged "would
be sufficient except for the fact that the statute is not broad enough
47 Id.
48 100

at 341, 110 S.E. at 813.

WV.Va. 213, 130 S.E. 451 (1925).

49 Id. at 216, 130 S.E. at 452.

s0 See note 8 supra. The indictment or any count therein might also be
bad for other reasons; for example, there might be joined in one count distinct
offenses which could not be properly joined in an indictment. See part E of
text.
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to include these facts as an offense."-'. With only one "offense" alleged any duplicity which seemed to have been present has disappeared.
Such allegations as to the seeming offenses may be as confusing to
the accused as two or more offenses effectually charged; but any
basis for attack on the ground of duplicity is eliminated when the
court finds that he was legally charged with the commission of
only one crime.
The most recent case in point upholds a count "alleging" both
selling and aiding and abetting the sale of alcoholic liquor without
a state license, using these words:
"... the instant indictment does not charge defendant
with two distinct offenses: it effectively charges defendant with
the illegal sale of alcoholic liquor without a State license,
and ineffectively charges defendant with illegally aiding and
abetting in the sale of alcoholic liquor without a State license.
The allegations of the indictment bearing on 'the purported
charge of aiding and abetting are not sufficient to charge the
offense, so that, in our opinion, those allegations' may be regarded as surplusage ....,52
The court therein relied upon State v. Gould,5 3 where the indictment chaiged that the defendent did "cruelly beat, shoot, torture,
and otherwise ill-treat" a mule. It was held that the words, "shoot,
torture and otherwise ill-treat," were surplusage. The statute
covered these offenses: "over-drive, torture, torment, deprive of
necessary sustenance, or unnecessarily, or cruelly beat, or needlessly
mutilate, or kill" any domestic animal. The court reasoned that
"shoot and otherwise ill-treat" were not acts named in the statute,
and "torture" joined with "beat" was unnecessary since both together charged but one offense, that is, torture by beating. This
decision was thus based on both insufficient allegations as to more
than one crime and the statute being too narrow to include more
than one of the offenses alleged.
More precise application of the second technique of finding
only one offense alleged may be found in State v. Wolfe.5 4 The
specific question framed by the trial court was whether the indictment was duplicitous due to the fact that its averments, "if regarded as sufficient to properly charge an offense" under a specific
statute, also charged an offense under a provision of the state
51 These two approaches, as to the effect of surplusage on duplicity, are

taken from the cases which are cited in the text which follows. Compare also
the Hudson case discussed in the text supra.
52 State v. Howard, 137 W. Va. 519, 541, 73 S.E.2d 18, 31
(1952). Italics

supplied.

53 26 W. Va. 258 (1885).
54

128 W. Va. 414, 36 S.E.2d 849 (1946).
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constitution. The answer was negative since the court held that
the constitution provision was not self-executing as to its criminal
effect. State v. Marks5 5 and State v. Calhoun5" both involved
charges of "selling, offering, and exposing for sale and soliciting
and receiving orders for spirituous liquors, wines, porter, ale, beer
and drinks of like nature", without a state license. The statute
under which this indictment was drawn purported to make any
of these acts unlawful. In the Marks case, the court found that the
license required by another section of the statute was only for
selling spirituous liquors, concluding, "We think the indictment
'5 7
good, therefore, and that two separate offenses are not charged."
The Marks case was followed in the Calhoun case.
Some of the decisions seem to have applied the principle as
to surplusage in a rather unusual fashion; at times perhaps this has
been true because of the basis of attack on the indictment. In State
v. McCoy, 8 the allegations were that the defendants conspired for
the purpose of inflicting bodily injury and, pursuant to the conspiracy, did murder. A demurrer was interposed on the ground
that conspiracy was not sufficiently charged. The court felt that
conspiracy had been sufficiently alleged, but disposed of the point
by stating:
"... But why discuss this conspiracy part of the indictment? There was no conviction of conspiracy, but of murder.
Eliminate the conspiracy part, and we have left a good indictment for murder."55
In State v. Grove,60 a similar indictment combined conspiracy to
rape and rape. Objection on demurrer was that this charged a
conspiracy under the Red Men's Act and also rape. The count was
held sufficient, the court citing the McCoy case, also questioning
whether conspiracy under the act was charged, and concluding with
this observation:
... The charge of conspiracy may not have been necessary [as the means by which some of the parties might be
convicted of the crime resulting from the conspiracy], but,
if not, it may be treated as mere surplusage. After its elimination therefrom, what remains would sufficiently charge the
crime of rape ..
55

.1

65 W. Va. 523, 64 S.E. 616 (1909).

58 67 W. Va. 666, 69 S.E. 1098 (1910).

65 W. Va. at 526, 64 S.E. at 617.
r8 61 W. Va. 258, 57 S.E. 294 (1907).
59 Id. at 259, 57 S.E. at 294.
8o61 W. Va. 697, 57 S.E. 296 (1907).
61 Id. at 700, 57 S.E. at 297.
57
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A more extreme application of the surplusage principle was
used in the two Wisman cases 2 James and George Wisman were
tried under the same indictment, which charged both conspiracy to
inflict bodily harm and, in pursuance thereof, felonious and
malicious assault. In the first case, contention was made that
"the indictment is bad because it contains in one count two distinct
offenses", one being a misdemeanor and the other a felony. The
indictment was held good; partly on the basis that the conspiracy
charge was included within the greater charge or the one-offense
basis, 3 but also on the basis that the allegations as to conspiracy
"could be left out as surplusage". To complete the reasoning on the
second point, the court added,

"...

indeed, they are not necessary to

complete an indictment for malicious maiming, and without them
64
the offense is charged."
The point was more directly placed before the court in the
second case concerning this indictment, since the trial court tried
the case on the theory that two felonies were charged in the one
count, one under the maiming statute and the other under the
Red Men's Act. At this point the appellate court placed the
holding in the earlier case and in this case on the basis that the
charge of conspiracy must be disregarded as surplusage. The result:
"... By so doing, we violate no rule of pleading [two
separate felonies in one count], we sustain the indictment, and
conform to the prior holdings of this court in . . . State v.
McCoy, 61 W. Va. 258. In the latter case, it was held:
"'An indictment charging conspiracy to inflict
punishment and bodily injury on the person, and
charging also'for murder, held good as an indictment
for murder.' "6

Starting with the McCoy case which held that an objection to
an indictment on the basis of insufficiency of allegations as to
conspiracy was not well founded, the circle was completed to hold
that a count alleging two felonies was not duplicitous since adequate
allegations therein as to one felony could be disregarded as surplusage.
In a rather recent case a demurrer was interposed on the ground
that in one count it was alleged that the defendant did unlawfully

62 State v. Wisman, 93 W. Va. 183, 116 S.E. 698 (1923); State v. Wisman,
98 W. Va. 250, 126 S.E. 701 (1925).
63 See part B of text.
6493 V. Va. at 187, 116 S.E. at 699.
6o98 W. Va. at 253, 126 S.E. at 702.
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transmit and permit to be transmitted certain information. 6 In
part this was the court's answer:
"... The state might be required... to strike out what
would otherwise be treated as" surplusage... State v. Calhoun,
67 W. Va. 666, 69 S.E. 1098. 67
But, the Calhoun case merely disregarded as surplusage allegations
which alleged no crime under the statute.
If duplicity be more than a merely formal defect, even the
orthodox surplusage approaches seem to be prejudicial to the
defendant. These artificial extensions of the surplusage principle
can only be viewed as "affinnance at any cost." As a group these
cases indicate that duplicity is a highly technical defect and that
indictments ought not be held bad if this be the only defect therein.
E. Duplicity andJoinder in Separate Counts
"An indictment in a single count is not fatally defective
because it charges more than one offense, provided the offenses
charged are such that they could be embraced in the same
indictment containing a count for each offense." 68
Although this approach was not used in the opinion in the
Digman case, reliance therein being placed on a decision which
applied the statute to bar attack on the ground of duplicity, this
point in the syllabus is the most specific reference to this test found
in any of the West Virginia cases. This approach to duplicity
seems a very sound one; namely, that in view of the statute the
combination of two or more offenses in one count in an indictment
does not in itself render the count fatally defective, but that the
count may be deficient for other reasons. In this case the suggestion
is that the count may be bad for having offenses joined therein
which cannot be joined in an indictment even though separate
counts be used.69
In the Jarrell case, the first to apply the statute preventing
attacks for matter of form, 70 the court permitted joinder in one
count of charges of carrying numerous types of deadly weapons
without a state license therefor. After referring to the rule permitting the joinder of both misdemeanors and felonies in an indictC0 State

v. C. & P. Telephone Co. of W. Va., 121 W. Va. 420, 4 S.E.2d 257

(1939).

Id. at 424, 4 S.E.2d at 259.
08 State v. Digman, 121 W. Va. 499, 5 SX.2d 11t (1939).
09 The same approach may be used in a civil case, namely, "there may be
67

united in a single count of a declaration causes of action which could not be
joined in separate counts." See Carlin, supra note 4, at 242. Thus, although
the count in the declaration would not be bad on demurrer for duplicity, it
might be bad for misjoinder of causes of action.
70 See text at n. 12 supra.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol58/iss1/3

14

Lugar: Duplicitous Allegations in Indictments
DUPLICITOUS ALLEGATIONS
ment by the use of different counts, the court made these observations as to the joinder in one count:
".... In view of this rule, the argument ab inconvenienti
wholly fails. As the accused may be charged with two or more
offenses in one indictment, by the use of several counts, he
must prepare to meet all of them, when he is so charged."'1
A similar count charging these offenses was approved on the basis
72
of this decision in State v. Merico.
In several other cases the court has answered the contention
that a count was "duplicitous" by applying the rule as to joinder
of offenses in an indictment. In State v. Miller7 3 it was charged
that the defendant "did unlawfully sell, give, offer, expose, keep
and store for sale and gift, liquors." The court made this response:
"The suggestion that the indictment is bad for duplicity is
without merit. It is true that if the defendant did sell, give,
offer, . . . liquors, he may be guilty of separate and distinct
offenses, but it is well established in this jurisdiction that the
joinder of two or more offenses of the same general nature
in an indictment is not4 ground of demurrer. . . . State v.
Jarrell, 76 W. Va. 263.."7
Note that the Jarrellcase was cited in support of this position. The
Miller case holding as to "duplicity" was approved by dictum in
State v. Cook. 75 A similar approach was used by Judge Lively in his
concurring opinion in State v. Wisman.70 He there questioned the
correctness of a statement he had written in an earlier opinion for
the court concerning the same indictment. 77 He no longer felt
that the jury could convict on the one count for conspiracy alleged
therein if they acquitted the defendant of malicious wounding as
there alleged. He took the position that. this would be improper
since on the facts of the case these two offenses could not properly
be combined in an indictment.
The same approach was sought in this manner in State v.
Tomlin:78
"Here the offense of possession is not only charged in the
same indictment but in the same count thereof, which is
certainly not permissible unless the charges of the several of71 State v. Jarrell, 76 W. Va.
7277 W. Va. 314, 87 S.E. 370
73 89 W. Va. 84, 108 S.E. 487
74 Id. at 86, 108 S.E. at 488.

263, 265, 85 S.E. 525, 526 (1915).
(1915).
(1921).

75 90

W. Va. 600, 606, 111 S.E. 595, 597 (1922).
7698 W. Va. 250, 786 S.E. 701 (1925).
77 State v. Wisman, 93 W. Va. 183, 116 S.E. 698 (1923). For discussion of
the application of the surplusage principle in the two Wisman cases, see text at
notes 62 to 65 supra.
7886 W. Va. 300, 103 S.E. 110 (1920).
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Lenses made in the conjunctive can be treated as separate and
distinct counts. For the purpose of this case we need not
decide the latter question . . .. 711
If the allegations in a count violate only the rule against
duplicity, the fault seems merely formal. As such, West Virginia
Code, Chapter 62, Article 2, Section 10, may bar an attack by
demurrer or motion to quash. However, if the allegations therein
charge offenses which cannot be joined in the same indictment,
even when stated in separate counts, there is nothing in this section
of the Code to bar the attack. Other statutes or common law rules
permitting joinder of different offenses in the same indictment
would determine the issue. 0
Summary
If a count in an indictment charges the commission of two or
more crimes, it may be so defective as duplicitous that it will be
held insufficient on demurrer or motion to quash. However, six
West Virginia decisions have held that this defect is merely formal
and cannot be reached by either of these techniques in view of the
provisions of West Virginia Code, Chapter 62, Article 2, Section 10.
Four of these cases have involved the joinder of felonies. In later
decisions the court has continued to talk as if such joinder of
felonies would make the count fatally defective since it would
violate a "fundamental law of pleading",81 In these decisions
various other techniques have been used to sustain indictments in
which two or more crimes, felonies or misdemeanors, have been
joined in a single count, ignoring the cases which relied on the
statute, or on decisions based thereon, to bar attack on the basis of
duplicity.
In this setting, "no one can know what is the law on the subject".8 2 However, aside from occasional statements that duplicity
may be a basis for quashing an indictment if joinder of felonies be
involved, the court seems now to view duplicity as in fact a technical
defect because no recent case has been found in which the court
actually held an indictment bad on the basis of duplicity. One
technique or another has been used to avoid this result.
Id. at 303, 103 S.E. at 111. Italics supplied.
VA. CoDE c. 62, art. 2, § 24 (Michie 1955) (permitting a count
for receiving stolen goods or for embezzlement to be joined with a count for
larceny; and permitting a count for false swearing to be joined with a count
for perjury); id. c. 61, art 3, § 12 (permitting joinder of counts for breaking and
entering, or for entering without breaking, the house or building mentioned in
the count for burglary); see generally Note 57 W. VA. L. REv. 196 (1955).
s1 See note 24 supra.
82 See text at note 2 supra.
79

so E.g., W.
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